This article looks at the first three years' experience under the new organisation and its 'constitution'. At this point in time, appraisals of the launch and early experience of the WTO are almost uniformly optimistic and approving. The new organisation has had a successful launch, it has engaged in a
number of different activities (not all of which have individually been successful), and it has put into practice a quite remarkable set of new procedures for dispute settlement among nations concerning trade matters.
Therefore, it is worthwhile to try to draw some conclusions about this early experience and what it might portend for the future. This is the purpose of this article which intends, furthermore, to put forward some generalisations or tentative hypotheses about the meaning and potential of these early years of experience. The article will do this in four parts. First, it will provide a brief overview of the history, background, and 'landscape' of the new organisation. It illustrates the continuity from its predecessor, the GATT, and some of the major problems of the GATT and how the Uruguay Round negotiators approached those problems in developing the new organisation and the extraordinarily extensive treaty of the Uruguay Round.
The second part examines the jurisprudence of the new organisation during the early years up to March 1998. A brief overview of the dispute settlement cases will be presented, along with some indications of the potential meaning of those cases and some hypotheses about the directions of the new Appellate Body. The third part of this article discusses some of the emerging constitutional problems, particularly questions about allocation of power within the organisation, and between the organisation and the member states. Particular attention will be given to the potential ability or inability of the organisation to cope with some of the many problems of 'globalisation' which are emerging. Finally, this article will suggest some possible solutions or partial solutions to some problems, and draw some conclusions and prognoses.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY, BACKGROUND AND 'LANDSCAPE' OF THE WTO
Looking back over the 1946 94 history of the GATT allows one to reflect on how surprising it was that this relatively feeble institution with many 'birth defects' managed to play such a significant role for almost five decades. It certainly was far more successful than could have been fairly predicted in the late 1940s.
World economic developments pushed The GATT to a central role during the past few decades. The growing economic interdependence of the world has been increasingly commented ' . . . a metnod* o^ restoring a ba/ance o^ benefits and* tnat, Jor any reason, may naye been disturbed". Jt is nownere described"
(» a pena/ty to be imposed" on member; wVio may Wo/ate tneir ob/iaafions or a; a sanction to injure tnaf rne.se oblations wi// be observed". ^ut even tnouan it is not so re^ard"ed", if M?7/ operate in jacf as a sanction and" a penalty. '
He further notes the procedure for obtaining a World Court opinion on the law involved in a dispute, and says, V^ basis is thus provided for the development of a body of international law to govern trade relationships.'
When one reflects on the almost fifty years of pre-WTO history of the GATT dispute settlement process, some generalisations seem both apparent and quite remarkable. With very meagre treaty language as a start, plus divergent alternative views about the policy goals of the system, the GATT, like so many human institutions, to some extent took on a life of its own. Both as to the dispute procedures (a shift from working parties to panels), and as to the substantive focus of the system (a shift from general ambiguous ideas about 'nullification or impairment/ to more analytical or 'legalistic' approaches to interpret rules of treaty obligation, the GATT panel procedure evolved toward more rule orientation.
The GATT dispute settlement process became admired enough that various trade policy interests sought to bring their subjects under it. This was one of the motivations which led both the intellectual property interests and the services trade interests to urge those subjects to be included in the Uruguay Round. The
Uruguay Round results, of course, apply the new Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) procedures to those subjects. these impacts will be the focus of the next sub-section. For this sub-section, however, it is of considerable interest to examine the characteristics and general approaches of the nine or ten reports made available by the Appellate Body divisions.
II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE WTO EARLY YEARS
First, the Appellate Body has made it reasonably clear that general international law is relevant and applies in the case of the WTO and its treaty annexes, including the GATT. In the past there has been some question about this, with certain parties arguing that the GATT was a 'separate regime,' in some way insulated from the general body of international law. The The second characteristic that seems to be emerging from the jurisprudence with the Appellate Body is a more deferential attitude towards national government decisions (or, in other words, more deference to national 'sovereignty'), than sometimes has been the case for the first-level panels or the panels under GATT. In some sense, therefore, the Appellate Body has been exercising more 'judicial restraint' and has been more hesitant to develop new ideas of interpreting the treaty language than sometimes has been the case in the first-level panels themselves. Although there is no clear explanation for this attitude of the Appellate Body, this may be attributed, nevertheless, to the fact that the Appellate Body roster contains relatively few GATT specialists. The Appellate Body, which generally is considered to have outstanding members, has members that are more 'generalist' than one would typically find on the first-level panels or in the GATT panels in previous years.
This could be a very good omen, because the care and 
The role of the WTO dispute settlement system in the New World trading framework
As mentioned in the previous sub-section, the dispute settlement system under the new procedures is having a profound impact on the world trade system. In particular, diplomats find themselves in new territory. Rather than operating in what is thoroughly a 'negotiating atmosphere', diplomats find themselves acting as lawyers, or relying on lawyers, much more heavily than before, and much more heavily than some of them would like. The dispute settlement procedure itself becomes part of the negotiating tactics for various Dispute Settlement attempts. To this end, reference is frequently made in the media to 'nation A' arguing against 'nation BY measures, and 'threatening to bring a case in the WTO' if it does not get the matter resolved. The negotiations concerning potential and threatened US action against Japanese automobile imports is a case in point, where the option to bring the case in the WTO apparently worked in a way that was deemed by the Japanese appropriately favourable to their negotiation (negotiating) position. In another case, Costa Rica, small as it is, brought a case against the giant of the north the US concerning import quotas in the US against the importation of cotton underwear and some other textile products. Costa Rica won the case, both at the first level and on appeal an outcome that is quite an eye-opener.
One interesting set of developments that has been evolving, first of all under the GATT and now under the WTO, is the participation of private attorneys who are retained by governments involved in the WTO dispute settlement process.
Small governments, in particular, often do not have in-house expertise that is adequate to handle some of the complex cases (or even some of the simple cases) which are finding their way into the WTO dispute settlement arena. Such states are put at a substantial disadvantage against large entities like the US or the European Community which have such in-house expertise.
These smaller states consequently have in some circumstances been eager to retain the services of private attorneys, usually Europeans or Americans. But there has been some objection made, most often by the US, to the practice. During the course of the last year, developments seem to have moved very substantially in the direction of permitting this practice of governments retaining private attorneys, with certain limitations. Although this represents a commendable move, it will nevertheless necessitate a certain amount of careful thinking about the role and relationship of the private attorneys vis-a-vis their government clients, and vis-a-vis the WTO system. It will be wise for the DSB or other appropriate bodies to develop certain standards and ethical rules, perhaps including conflictof-interest rules as well as confidentiality rules, which would generally be recommended to governments as part of the
contract they use to retain attorneys. If this matter receives appropriate attention, it will facilitate the evolution of the appropriate practices and documents in this respect.
//. EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE WTO
Almost every human institution has to face the task of how to evolve and change in the face of conditions and circumstances not originally considered when the institution was set up. This is most certainly true in respect to the original GATT, and now in The crucial question remains, however, how will the WTO solve or attempt to solve some of these issues? The First Ministerial, held at Singapore in 1996, faced some of these questions. Many conclude that the results of that meeting were not terribly innovative in relation to ways to cope with new issues. Obviously, the ministers felt both the legal constraints of the WTO 'charter,' and political as well as economic constraints of attitudes of constituents in a number of different societies.
The issues needing resolution could be broadly grouped into two categories: (1) substantively new issues (such as some of those discussed or listed above), but also (2) Apart from formal amendments, one can look at the powers concerning decisions, waivers and formal interpretations.
Substantial constraints do exist, however, in each of these avenues.
Decision-making (at least as a fallback from attempts to achieve consensus) is generally ruled by a majority-vote system. However, there is language in the WTO charter (Article IX, paragraph 3), as well as the long practice under the GATT, that suggests that decisions cannot be used to impose new obligations on members. Waivers were sometimes used in the GATT as ways to innovate and adjust to new circumstances. This process, however, fell into disrepute and caused the negotiators to develop Uruguay Round texts that quite constrained the use of waivers. In particular, such a constraint concerned duration of waivers subjecting them, thereby, to explicit revocation authorities. The GATT had no formal provision regarding 'interpretation', and thus the GATT panels probably enjoyed greater scope for setting forth interpretations that would ultimately become embedded in the GATT practice and even subsequently negotiated treaty language.
However, the WTO addresses this issue of formal interpretations directly, imposing a very stringent voting requirement of threefourths of the total membership. Since it is often observed that a quarter of the WTO membership is not present at key meetings, one can see that the formal interpretation process is not an easy one to achieve.
Given these various constraints, it would be understandable if Oo o dramatic consequence to the system. But even the fine-tuning can be difficult to achieve given some of the constraints on decision-making. One of the geniuses of the GATT and its o o history was its ability to evolve partly through trial and error and practice. Indeed the dispute settlement under GATT evolved over four decades quite dramatically with such concepts as 'prima facie nullification', or the use of 'panels' instead of 'working parties', becoming gradually embedded in the process and under the Tokyo Round understanding on dispute settlement became 'definitive' by consensus action of the contracting parties.
But the language of the DSU (as well as the WTO 'charter') seems to greatly constrain some of this approach compared to the GATT. DSU Article 2, paragraph 4, states 'Where the rules and procedures of this understanding provide for the DSB to take a decision, it shall do so by consensus.' The definition of consensus is then supplied in a footnote, and although not identical with 'unanimity', provides that an objecting member can block consensus. Likewise, the WTO 'charter' itself provides a consensus requirement for amendments to Annexes 2 and 3 of the WTO^. Thus the opportunity to evolve by experiment and trial and effort, plus practice over time, seems considerably more constrained under the WTO than was the case under the very loose and ambiguous language of the GATT, with its minimalist institutional language.
Thus, we have a potential for a stalemate, or potential for inability to cope with some of the problems that will be facing and are already facing the new WTO institution. This requires exploring a possible solution in this respect. This is the focus of the following and final part of this article.
IV EXPLORING POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AND DEVELOPING CONCLUSIONS AND PROGNOSES FOR THE FUTURE
In order to avoid the potential stalemate problem referred to in the previous section, various possible solutions could be developed. For instance, the WTO can develop somewhat better opportunities for explicit amendments, using the two-thirds (and three-fourths in substance cases) power of amendment in the WTO charter. By the same token, some of the decisions that are possible by the WTO membership at its ministerial meeting or various council meetings can 'creep up on' some of the issues and decide them in a way so that certain small steps of reform can be taken. These decisions will become part of the 'practice under the agreement' referred to in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. A third avenue can stem from the dispute settlement details and potential changes in procedures. In this respect, it may be possible to work within the 'consensus rule' to make some changes in Annex 2 (the DSU). It at least appears that this does not require national government member treaty text amendments, and thus avoids some of the elaborate procedures of national government ratification of treaties, etc.
The question of such consensus relates to at least two different kinds of decisions: changes in the text of the DSU; and decisions by the DSB which could involve incidental or interstitial and ancillary procedural rules, assuming that they are not inconsistent with treaty provisions of the DSU. Intuitively, the consensus rule apparently applies in this context. There may be a few situations where basic, small and relatively unimportant decisions can be made as a matter of practice of the administration of the dispute settlement system, such as decisions about how to interpret time deadlines, or the form of complaints that should be filed, or the development of a relatively uniform set of procedural rules about activities of panels and panel members, translations, documentation, etc. Even then there is at least some likelihood that an objecting member could force an issue to go to the DSB and that member could dare block consensus.
With respect to larger 'new subjects' for WTO additions, subjects as significant, for example, as rules on investment, or competition policy; or even environmental rules, it appears that matters will be somewhat more difficult even than the procedural changes. If amendment of the agreements is not feasible, one could look at the WTO Annex 4 'plurilateral' agreements which are optional, and thus in the drafting process do not necessarily need to be subject to 'consensus'. However, to add a negotiated plurilateral agreement to Annex 4 of the WTO does require the so-called 'full consensus'. Thus once again, that could be blocked, and clearly that blocking opportunity will translate back into the negotiating process about what can be negotiated to be placed in such a new potential plurilateral agreement.
Accordingly it may be that the critical development for the WTO is to address 'consensus' procedures and thus give attention to the meaning and practice of consensus. In this context, it might be feasible to develop certain practices about consensus that would lead member nations of the WTO to 'self restrain' themselves from blocking a consensus in certain circumstances and under certain conditions. In other words, the General Council, or the DSB (General Council acting with different hats) might develop a series of criteria about consensus concerning certain kinds of decisions, which would strongly suggest to Member States that if these criteria are fulfilled, they would normally refrain from blocking the consensus. This approach could be compared to the practice in the European Community history and jurisprudence of the 'Luxembourg Compromise', where it has been understood that governments would refrain from exercising their potential vote against a measure in certain circumstances, unless the measure involves something of 'vital interest' to the nation members involved.
O
While not pursuing the analogy too far, one might see something similar develop in the context of the WTO.
However, it is prudent at this point to consider what some of the conditions or circumstances might be to encourage nations to refrain from blocking a consensus on some of the more purely procedural reforms that might be desired, either in amending the DSU or in decisions of the DSB. The following might be considered:
Firstly, the major criterion is that a proposed measure must be consistent with the fundamental principles of the WTO, including MFN, and perhaps some of the substantive requirements of treaty texts such as national treatment, or restraints on border measures. Normally, procedural changes ought not to be directed to challenge those particular rules anyway.
In addition, the requirement of a supermajority threshold, such as 70 per cent of the members present, is recommended.
And last but not least, it may be helpful in this context that the consideration of any new procedural measure should first be examined in depth by a special expert group appointed by the DSB or the WTO membership. This group would consist of considerable expertise on legal procedures and it would be recognised as impartial and not prone to be pushing one reform or another for particular advantage of the nation concerned. To this end, it may be useful that the members of the expert group should be, like panels, working and discussing in their own right and judgment and not on instruction of governments. Indeed, such an expert group might draw upon individuals who are not part of the diplomatic missions at Geneva, and in some cases not even government employees. The expert group could prepare certain recommendations or evaluate proposals that have otherwise been made, and then send them to the DSB, or to the WTO General Council, with a recommendation of adoption. Then if the other criteria mentioned above were fulfilled, again members would be o strongly encouraged to refrain from blocking consensus, partly with the notion that in the future they may be supporting some other measures which likewise would benefit from restraint in using consensus-blocking techniques.
Turning to more substantial reforms which might be developed through plurilateral agreements as candidates for Annex 4, one might also develop a set of criteria which would be used to persuade nation members to refrain from exercising consensus-blocking techniques. For example, criteria for a newplurilateral agreement that would benefit from such a developing practice over time (informal and not part of the treaty) could include the following:
The proposed agreement would not be inconsistent with any of the existing other rules of the WTO and its Annexes, especially Annex 1 (GATT, GATS, and TRIPS). Thus, MFN would be fulfilled where otherwise required by the rules of Annex f. Other measures already embodied in the treaties would likewise be a requirement of consistency for the newtreaty agreement. It has to be emphasised, however, that the new plurilateral agreement proposal would sometimes contain measures that would call for rules applying to those accepting the new protocol that differ from the other WTO rules. This should not, nevertheless, have any detrimental impact on the non-members of the new protocol.
The protocol or plurilateral agreement proposal should have among its proponents a 'substantial' number of members of the WTO. Substantial in this context should be interpreted in a way that makes it relatively clear that bilateral agreements would not be good candidates. Probably, the proposed protocol should include between ten and twenty WTO members, or alternatively the minimum number would be left ambiguous, as long as it was not just a few members. It could also be noted that smaller groups of members can enter into regional trading arrangements, provided that these are not inconsistent with the other rules of the WTO, particularly including Article XXIV of GATT.
The proposed plurilateral agreement should be open to accession by any WTO member. Possibly this ability to accede to the plurilateral agreement should be unconditional. That would mean that the proposal for a plurilateral agreement would have within its text all the measures to be required, leaving nothing further to be negotiated for accession. There might be some exception for a 'scheduling' type apparatus analogous to GATT tariff schedules or GATS service schedules.
It could be required that a majority vote of the Council would approve the addition of the plurilateral proposal to Annex 4. This majority vote could be something of a supermajority, such as two-thirds. Other formulas for the vote could be envisaged.
Since bringing a new plurilateral agreement under the WTO 'umbrella' by adding it to Annex 4 might have some financial implications for the costs of Secretariat and other assistance in enhancing and carrying out the plurilateral agreement, an additional principle to avoid consensus-blocking could be that the financial costs of the additional activity created by the proposed plurilateral agreement would be carried entirely by the members who have acceded to the plurilateral agreement, under a special budget item in the WTO financial system. Possibly with some approach like this to providing some constraint on the techniques of developing consensus, the risk of the consensus requirement creating stalemate and inability to evolve and cope with new problems in the global economy could be minimised. These criteria could be developed through resolutions of the General Council or the DSB, in the form of 'recommendations to members', and might provide the relatively informal practice which nevertheless could be effective over time. If such practice was reasonably successful, it might achieve some of the best of several divergent policies, namely allowing measures to go forward short of unanimity or total 
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